This paper considers one-way flow network formation games in which transmission through a series of agents is subject to decay. We analyze the myopic best-response dynamics of network formation games, occasionally perturbed by state-dependent random noises. Specifically, if an agent is isolated...

This paper considers the evolutionary dynamics of a free trade agreement (FTA) network formation game among N countries. We first explore the static model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2006) and precisely characterize the set of pairwise stable FTA networks. Then, we develop a dynamic model...

This paper considers a non-cooperative R&D network formation game. Instead of concentrating on R&D cooperation among firms, the paper focuses on one-way externality flow in which each firm forms links in the attempt to acquire others' R&D knowledge. It is assumed that a firm has an internal R&D...

The paper examines whether bilateral free trade agreements can lead to global free trade. We reconsider the endogenous tariff model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (<CitationRef CitationID="CR9">2006</CitationRef>) who study pairwise stability of free trade networks. We depart from their analysis by adopting the concept of pairwise...</citationref>