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If we understand well the individualization of land tenure rules under conditions of growing land scarcity and increased market integration, much less is known about the mode of evolution of the family farms possessing the land. Inspired by first-hand evidence from West Africa, this paper argues...
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We analyze the individualization of farm units in Mali in the sense of a transformation of purely collective farms into mixed units in which private plots coexist with collective fields. Since a moral-hazard-in-team problem plagues production on the latter and the household head extracts his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737571
This article provides a methodological bridge leading from the well-developed theory of credit rationing to the less developed territory of empirically identifying credit constraints. We begin by developing a simple model showing that credit constraints may take three forms: quantity rationing,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025676
Summary This paper examines why farm households seek informal loans in Piura, Peru, where formal lenders offer loans at lower interest rates. A panel data econometric analysis reveals that the informal sector serves various types of clients: households excluded from the formal sector but also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005176012
From field observations of credit cooperatives in Cameroon, we find that 19% of the loans taken are fully collateralized by savings held in the same institutions. This behavior is costly to the borrower, as it represents a net interest payment of about 24% per year. While traditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323905
We model the role of the informal credit sector in developing countries. The informational advantage of informal lenders is portrayed as the ability to monitor borrowers. Monitoring reduces the incentive problem and allows for contracts with lower collateral. This enables informal lenders to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009392397
We develop a model that shows that asymmetric information can result in two types of credit rationing: conventional quantity rationing, and “risk rationing,” whereby farmers are able to borrow but only under high-collateral contracts that offer them lower expected well-being than a safe,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009394245