We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An evolutionary rule for strategy modification is included to mimic...

We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the actual attendance is above or below L. For L∼N/2, the...

We show that evolution in a population of adaptive agents, repeatedly competing for a limited resource, can come to an abrupt halt. This transition from evolutionary to non-evolutionary behavior arises as the global resource level is changed, and is reminiscent of a phase transition to a frozen...

We present a generalization of the dynamical model of information transmission and herd behavior proposed by Eguı́luz and Zimmermann. A characteristic size of group of agents s0 is introduced. The fragmentation and coagulation rates of groups of agents are assumed to depend on the size of the...

We present analytic and numerical results for two models, namely the minority model and the bar-attendance model, which offer simple paradigms for a competitive marketplace. Both models feature heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality who act using inductive reasoning. We find that the...