This paper examines the foundations of the prediction that the costs of, and returns to, an investment in specific human capital will be shared between worker and firm, and hence that in the presence of specific human capital there will be a positive relationship between wage and tenure. It is...

Failure in the training market may result from credit constraints and the inability to insure against labour income uncertainty, deterring potential trainees, or labour market imperfections that create external benefits for firms. This paper constructs a model of a training market affected by...

This article reports the results of an empirical study of the impact of school inputs on pupils' performance in private (independent) schools in the United Kingdom, using a new school-level panel dataset constructed from information provided by the Independent Schools Information Service. The...

In this article, we report the results of an empirical study of the impact of school inputs on pupils’ performance in private (independent) schools in the United Kingdom. We use a new school-level panel dataset constructed from information provided by the Independent Schools Information...

This article investigates the hypothesis that when measures of specific human capital (such as job tenure) are included in earnings functions, there may be a sample selection bias because of job-matching effectsbecause workers with high unobserved match quality receive and accept high wage...

Training for skills that are transferable to other firms, but for which the external labor market is imperfectly competitive, cannot be analyzed using the traditional tools of general and specific training. It is known that firms (as well as workers) have an incentive to invest in such training...

A common assumption in equilibrium search and matching models of the labour market is that each firm posts a wage, to be paid to any worker hired. This paper considers the implications of firms posting contracts, in a random matching model with on-the-job search. More complex contracts enable...

Two sources of inefficiency in the provision of on-the-job training are examined: an externality between firms which arises if there is imperfect competition between firms in the labor market, and allocation inefficiency due to asymmetry of information about the value of the trained worker. The...

This paper explores the incentives faced by employers for supplying general training of the type given to craft apprentices. An investment model is developed in which the employer's return takes the form of reduced recruitment costs for skilled labor. An empirical model is derived and fitted to...