We describe a simple computing technique for the tournament choice problem. It rests upon relational modeling and uses the BDD-based computer system RelView for the evaluation of the relation-algebraic expressions that specify the solutions and for the visualization of the computed results. The...

The paper presents the bargaining model in which preferences of each player are expressed by the sequence of bargaining costs varying in time. There are theorems describing subgame perfect equilibria for some models with the bargaining costs varying in time. In the class of strategies...

We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes...

The paper presents the bargaining model in which preferences of each player are expressed by the sequence of bargaining costs varying in time. There are theorems describing subgame perfect equilibria for some models with the bargaining costs varying in time. In the class of strategies...

Opinion leaders are actors who have some power over their followers as they are able to influence their followers’ choice of action in certain instances. In van den Brink et al. (Homo Oeconomicus 28:161–185, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2011</CitationRef>) we proposed a two-action model for societies with opinion leaders. We...</citationref>