We characterize all anonymous VCG mechanisms by using queue efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals. By additionally imposing independence axioms, introduced by Chun (2006a) and Maniquet (2003), we characterize the pivotal and the reward-based pivotal mechanisms in the class...

We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler in Q J Econ 92:671–687, <CitationRef CitationID="CR31">1978</CitationRef>) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though...</citationref>

We extend the literature on the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value, by identifying a class of coalitional form games called PS games. We analyse the role of PS games in the context of queueing problems, and show that in the class of generalized queueing games only those...

We identify and characterize a natural and intuitive class of mechanisms called the k-pivotal mechanisms. The axioms used are efficiency, pairwise strategyproofness, equal treatment of equals and weak linearity. We also identify the subclass of these mechanisms which do not run a budget deficit...