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a decision dynamics model of cost control and corporate governance

Abdullah, A. B. M.; Murad, Md. Wahid; Hasan, Md. Mahadi - In: Journal of Developing Areas 49 (2015) 2, pp. 397-405

cost control and corporate governance. The model discusses why it is important to uphold the shareholders' interests and …This study is an attempt to develop a conceptual decision dynamics model in order to analyze the relationship between … requires protecting the interests of all stakeholders, cost control by that organization should be well guided by the corporate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212970

Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting

Schrand, Catherine M.; Zechman, Sarah L.C. - In: Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (2012) 1, pp. 311-329

A detailed analysis of 49 firms subject to AAERs suggests that approximately one-quarter of the misstatements meet the legal standards of intent. In the remaining three quarters, the initial misstatement reflects an optimistic bias that is not necessarily intentional. Because of the bias,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572404

Chapter 6. Law and Finance After a Decade of Research

La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; … - 2013

In the last dozen years, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country’s laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. Much of this research has dealt with rules...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025558

Hard corporate governance law in a soft law jurisdiction

Michael, Bryane; Goo, Say-hak - 2016

China's fuzzy corporate governance rules (whether hard or soft) do not help company managers, government officials and others coordinate and cooperate - the raison d’etre for corporate governance rules. In a corporate system dominated by personal relationships and rules, clarity and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011789071

Do institutional investors affect corporate governance through proxy voting and shareholder activism? : Evidence from India

Ganie, Irfan Rashid; Haldar, Arunima; Wani, Tahir Ahmad; … - In: International journal of organizational analysis 32 (2024) 9, pp. 1887-1912

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015121106

What are the Costs of Weakening Shareholder Primacy? Evidence from a U.S. Quasi-Natural Experiment

Bennett, Benjamin; Stulz, René M.; Wang, Zexi - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2025

We study the consequences of weakening shareholder primacy using Nevada Senate Bill 203 as a quasi-natural experiment. A difference-in-differences analysis shows that, instead of improving their governance in response to the Bill to reassure capital providers, affected firms experience a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015409860

Chapter 10. Evolution of Ownership and Control Around the World: The Changing Face of Capitalism

Franks, Julian; Mayer, Colin - 2017

This chapter documents the evolution of ownership and control of firms around the world over a hundred year period from … interests, the chapter argues that in some countries they played a central role not just in exercising control but also in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023371

Does corporate governance play an important role in BHC performance? Evidence from the U.S.

Wang, Wei-Kang; Lu, Wen-Min; Lin, Yi-Ling - In: Economic Modelling 29 (2012) 3, pp. 751-760

This study explores the relationship between the operating performance and corporate governance of bank holding companies (BHCs) in the U.S. The modified data envelopment analysis (DEA) is utilized to integrate the five rating indicators of CAMEL (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048703

Antitakeover provisions, managerial entrenchment and firm innovation

Chakraborty, Atreya; Rzakhanov, Zaur; Sheikh, Shahbaz - In: Journal of Economics and Business 72 (2014) C, pp. 30-43

number of citations to patents. Thus managers who are protected from takeover market perform worse on innovation. However …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744411

Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?

Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

not fired when performance deteriorates due to factors deemed explicitly to be beyond their control, nor are they fired …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491717