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Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies

Gomes, Armando R; Jehiel, Philippe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper considers the efficiency and convergence properties of dynamic processes of social and economic interactions, such as exchange economies, multilateral negotiations, merger and divestiture transactions, or legislative bargaining. The key general feature of the economy is that agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792299

Chapter 16. Formation of Networks and Coalitions

Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 729-779). 2011

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … discussion of efficient network and coalition formation procedures and directions for future research. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025687

Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution Policies

Drazen, Allan; Limão, Nuno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We consider a bargaining model of the interaction between a government and interest groups in which, unlike existing models, neither side is assumed to have all the bargaining power. The government will then find it optimal to constrain itself in the use of transfer policies to improve its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504570

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

Bozbay, İrem; Dietrich, Franz; Peters, Hans - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 571-590

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049697

Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma

Maruta, Toshimasa; Okada, Akira - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 269-284

We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisonerʼs dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049791

The Red Queen Paradox: A Proper Name for a Popular Game - Note

Khalil, Elias L. - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 153 (1997) 2, pp. 411-415

HOLM [1995] claims that the prisoners' dilemma story is dubious: Each prisoner may confess even when innocent. However, this apparent failing can be remedied. The story is dubious rather because it is already institution-bound (the trust which binds the prisoners) and, therefore, its range is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764356

Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games

Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2010) 1, pp. 7-33

multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the "proposer commitment" procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash's two …-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to "threats." We establish links to classical cooperative game theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008539881

Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness

Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 3, pp. 1300-1312

, and of Schummer) by providing the players with a richer set of strategies, making it dominant for every coalition C to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572370

Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms

Friedman, Eric J. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 139-151

We describe the construction and analysis of asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms, in which a variety of axioms are applied to subsets of the agents/goods. We show that the analysis can be quite subtle as apparently similar axiomatizations lead to significantly different results; in particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573661

Sequential teamwork in competitive environments: Theory and evidence from swimming data

Neugart, Michael; Richiardi, Matteo G. - In: European Economic Review 63 (2013) C, pp. 186-205

Many tasks require the input by more than one person very often with members of the team contributing sequentially. However, team production is plagued by disincentive problems. We investigate individual incentives to team production with sequential contributions and competing teams. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702963