We experimentally investigate behavior in sequential one-shot transactions which are governed by non-binding contracts. In a second, incomplete information treatment, contracts are binding for some players. While according to traditional game-theoretical analysis no trade is expected in the...

In corporate contests, employees compete for a prize. Ideally, contests induce employees to exert productive effort which increases their probability of winning. In many environments, however, employees can also improve their own ranking position by harming their colleagues. Such negative...

We experimentally investigate how different information about others’ individual contributions affects conditional cooperators’ willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions are...

Die experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung kann eingesetzt werden, um kausale Einflussfaktoren von Verhalten unter kontrollierten Rahmenbedingungen zu identifizieren. Insbesondere ermoeglicht sie Einsichten ueber Verhaltenstendenzen in moralischen Dilemmata wie z. B. Situationen, in denen...

Economic interactions often take place in open communities, where agents are free to leave in order to join a more preferred community. Tiebout (1956) conjectured that “voting with feet” might generate considerable efficiency gains, since individuals with different preferences sort...