Prevention policies against flood, such as dams or levees, are commonly designed by local jurisdictions and for most, they exert externalities on neighbouring jurisdictions. We study a model in which each jurisdiction chooses its collective prevention effort depending on the flood risk and on...

The willingness of households to pay for prevention against industrial risks can be revealed by real estate markets. By using very rich microdata, we study housing prices in the vicinity of hazardous industries near three important French cities. We show that the impact of hazardous plants on...

We consider an oligopoly market where firms offer insurance coverage against a risk characterised by aggregate uncertainty. Firms behave as if they were risk averse for a standard reason of costly external finance. The model consists in a two-stage game where firms choose their internal capital...

This paper presents a dynamic model of the reinsurance market for catastrophe risks. The model is based on the classical capacity-constraint assumption. Reinsurers choose every year the quantity of risk they cover and the level of external capital they raise to cover these risks. The model...