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The influence relation was introduced by Isbell [Isbell, J.R., 1958. A class of simple games. Duke Math. J. 25, 423-439] to qualitatively compare the a priori influence of voters in a simple game, which by construction allows only "yes" and "no" votes. We extend this relation to voting games...
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Voting power theories measure the ability of voters to influence the outcome of an election under a given voting rule. In general, each theory gives a different evaluation of power, raising the question of their appropriateness, and calling for the need to identify classes of rules for which...
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The desirability relation was introduced by Isbell (A class of simple games 25: 423–439, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">1958</CitationRef>) to qualitatively compare the a priori influence of voters in a simple game. In this paper, we extend this desirability relation to simple games with coalition structure. In these games, players...</citationref>
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