In a framework à la Martin (1993) we introduce a common component in the managers' private information in order to address three related questions: What is the impact of contracts that reward managers on the basis of realized profits on firms' productive and allocative efficiency relative to...

<i> A Note on Adverse Selection in Oligopolistic Markets </i> (di Riccardo Martina, Salvatore Piccolo) - ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets. The note is aimed at characterizing the relationship between competition and market distortions entailed by...

This note explores the impact of reciprocal altruism on the equilibrium outcome of a two-stage oligopoly game with managerial frms. The structure of the classical two-stage oligopoly game with managerial incentives with strategic substitutes (quantity competition) generates a typical...

We consider a simple economy where self interested taxpayers have incentives to evade taxes and to escape sanctions by bribing public officials in charge of tax collection. However, tax collectors may be monitored by second-level inspectors whose incentives to exert detection activity are...