This book surveys how economists engage with knowledge and beliefs in various fields of economic analysis, such as general equilibrium theory, decision theory, game theory, experimental economics, evolutionary theory of the firm, financial markets and the history of economic thought.

We analyze the preference aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and observable preferences. More precisely, we endow individuals and society with sets of possible von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions over lotteries. We generalize the...

We provide a generalization of Harsanyi's (1955) aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto...

This paper studies the properties of a general equilibrium model with purely microeconomic risk, in which agents behave according to Choquet expected utility (i.e., they maximize a non-additive expected utility). This formalization represents a behavior exhibiting uncertainty aversion or...

Following the seminal works of Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), roughly put, an agent’s subjective beliefs are said to be ambiguous if the beliefs may not be represented by a unique probability distribution, in the standard Bayesian fashion, but instead by a set of...

In a multiple priors model á la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), we provide necessary and sufficient behavioral conditions ensuring the countable additivity and non-atomicity of all priors. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005