Prevention policies against flood, such as dams or levees, are commonly designed by local jurisdictions and for most, they exert externalities on neighbouring jurisdictions. We study a model in which each jurisdiction chooses its collective prevention effort depending on the flood risk and on...

The willingness of households to pay for prevention against industrial risks can be revealed by real estate markets. By using very rich microdata, we study housing prices in the vicinity of hazardous industries near three important French cities. We show that the impact of hazardous plants on...

This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a...

The present paper thoroughly explores second-best efficient allocations in an insurance economy with adverse selection. We start with a natural extension of the classical model, assuming less than perfect risk perception. We characterize the constraints on efficient redistribution, and we...