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This paper explores the hold-up problem between two parties (an entrepreneur and an investor) when one of the parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to commit not to repudiate the initial contract. To mitigate hold-up we allow the parties to stage investments over time and derive the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014589100
We study a market-entry game with a second-mover advantage. In the symmetric equilibrium, there can be a non-monotonic relationship between the probability with which a player will invest (entry) and the length of time until the deadline. Moreover, the probability of investment can move...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014589106
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005499553
We extend the propertyrights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010736717
This paper explores the hold-up problem between two parties (an entrepreneur and an investor) when one of the parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to commit not to repudiate the initial contract. To mitigate hold-up we allow the parties to stage investments over time and derive the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086905
We study a market-entry game with a second-mover advantage. In the symmetric equilibrium, there can be a non-monotonic relationship between the probability with which a player will invest (entry) and the length of time until the deadline. Moreover, the probability of investment can move...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005579450
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005715648
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010696823
We explore the implications of altruism in family firms for the allocation of decision-making rights. Our results suggest that centralization occurs in a broader range of circumstances in family than in nonfamily firms, consistent with empirical evidence. We show that an agent might remain in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272934
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010007658