Why do policies and business practices that ignore the moral and generous side of human nature often fail? Should the idea of economic man—the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus—determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel...

Treating civic preferences as endogenous and government policies and tax capacities as both an influence on and a consequence of their evolution is an important new strand of thinking to which Besley has contributed. I ask: Does his model provide a convincing explanation of the way that civic...

We explore the contribution of reciprocity and other non selfish motives to the political viability of the modern welfare state. In the advanced economies, a substantial fraction of total income is regularly transferred from the better off to the less well off, with the approval of the...

Where such behaviors as risk-taking and hard work are not subject to complete contracts, some distributions of assets (for instance the widespread use of tenancy) may preclude efficient contractual arrangements. In particular, the distribution of wealth may affect: (a) residual claimancy over...

Contributors to this volume argue that to understand capitalism in evolution, this diversity of systems and approaches must be taken into account and their individual evolutions analysed. This book represents a major understanding of the evolution of capitalism in the twenty first century and...

Institutional and Social Dynamics of Growth and Distribution presents a set of original contributions to the much-debated issues of long-run economic growth in relation to institutional and social progress.

This volume presents a collection of essays honoring Professor Thomas E. Weisskopf, one of the most prominent contributors to the field of radical economics. Beginning his academic career at Harvard before moving to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, Professor Weisskopf has spent the past...