Considering a differentiated mixed duopoly we show that when privatization and pollution tax are used together environmental damage will be non-monotone in the level of privatization, and optimal privatization is always partial privatization. Whether privatization will improve the environment or...

type="main" xml:lang="en" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>This paper develops a model of managerial delegation in the case of monopoly, without relying on agency theory based arguments, and examines its implications for social welfare. It shows that, in the presence of network externalities, (a) it is optimal for a...</p>

We show under general demand and cost conditions that in a mixed duopoly with pollution the government can implement the socially optimal outputs and abatements by a tax-subsidy scheme and keeping the public firm fully public. The scheme requires taxing outputs and subsidizing abatements at...

This paper investigates the effects of cross-ownership on optimal privatization, and vice-versa, in mixed duopoly. It shows that cross-ownership is profitable to the private firm only if the level of privatization of the public firm is sufficiently high. In equilibrium, cross-ownership does not...