We investigate the relationship between corruption and economic performance, focusing on the historical roots of the former. We claim that a sequential mechanism linking history to development exists: first, history defines the quality of social capital; then, social capital determines the level...

We study the decisions of a politician who maximizes his probability of being re-elected, which depends on the enactment of legislative instruments defined ‘scandalous’ because of their highly redistributive content. The agents are a politician and the voters; the legislative instruments...

This paper tests the consistency between the responsibility and the yardstick competition hypotheses. If no evidence is found that voters reelect mayors comparing their performance with those of neighboring jurisdictions, strategic interactions among municipalities cannot be properly interpreted...

The relationship between income inequality and polarization is an empirical fact: a change in equality might occur together with a change in polarization. At the same time, polarization might emerge while inequality remains constant. The outcome of this process entails relevant information on...