This paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying. We show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize crossnational externalities. We argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying. We also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign...

Can lobbying internalize cross-national externalities? This paper investigates this in a two-country economy where governments regulate labour markets through national labour standards, but are subject to lobbying. We study four different lobbying architectures and show that cross-national...

We study how immigration policies are determined under voting in a two-country model where immigration redistributes income from wages to capital. Migration decisions are endogenous, there exist border enforcement costs and preference for home-country consumption. We model the migration policy...

We study a pure exchange economy with infinite-lived agents, in which a share of consumption purchases must be paid cash. The economy may exhibit multiple equilibria, no matter what the fundamental specification, the only requirement being a share of consumption to be paid cash sufficiently low....

An increasing literature fosters selective immigration policies as a tool to increase human capital in both source and destination countries. These policies are supposed to prompt incentives to education, and-if selection is sufficiently severe-to increase the human capital stock in source...