We let subjects take risky decisions that affect themselves and a passive recipient. Adding a requirement to justify their choices significantly reduces loss aversion. This indicates that such an accountability mechanism may be effective at debiasing loss aversion in agency relations.

Risk-aversion has generally been found to decrease in income. This may lead one to expect that poor countries will be more risk-averse than rich countries. Recent comparative findings with students, however, suggest the opposite, giving rise to a risk-income paradox. This paper tests this...

There is ample empirical evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of the population exhibits social preferences. Recent work also shows that social preferences influence the effectiveness of incentives in labor relations. Hence, when making contracting decisions, employers should take...

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk...

Risk attitudes are known to be sensitive to large stake variations. However, little is known on the sensitivity to moderate variations in stakes. This is important for studies that want to compare risk attitudes between countries or over time. I find that variations of ±20% affect only utility,...

This paper finds preference reversals in measurements of ambiguity aversion, even if psychological and informational circumstances are kept constant. The reversals are of a fundamentally different nature than the reversals found before because they cannot be explained by context-dependent...