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Sustaining cooperation : community enforcement vs. specialized enforcement

Acemoglu, Daron; Wolitzky, Alexander - 2015

specialized enforcement technology is sufficiently effective, cooperation is best sustained by a "single enforcer punishment …We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement … following deviations by regular agent is that such actions, by reducing future cooperation, would decrease the amount of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491715

Chapter 11 Natural Kantian or ZOO ECONOMICUS ? Evolutionary theories of selfishness and altruism among men and beasts

Bergstrom, Theodore C. - In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and …, (pp. 771-817). 2006

cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity, and punishment-based group norms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023672

Adaptationist punishment in humans

Kurzban, Robert; DeScioli, Peter - In: Journal of Bioeconomics 15 (2013) 3, pp. 269-279

about these welfare gains is not logically licensed. In short, labeling punishment “altruistic” because it has the effect of … punishment can help solve collective action problems. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010989673

Managing Conflicts in Relational Contracts

Li, Jin; Matouschek, Niko - In: American Economic Review 103 (2013) 6, pp. 2328-51

A manager and a worker are in an infinitely repeated relationship in which the manager privately observes her opportunity costs of paying the worker. We show that the optimal relational contract generates periodic conflicts during which effort and expected profits decline gradually but recover...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815683

The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game

Cheikbossian, Guillaume - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 68-82

strategies which support cooperation in one group only. These last strategies have the property that cheating on the agreement in … the cooperative group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion … is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049667

On dynamic compromise

Bowen, T. Renee; Zahran, Zaki - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 391-419

Most legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to pass a proposal, so why donʼt legislative outcomes favor only a bare majority? We show that compromise can be achieved if legislators are neither too impatient nor too patient, and initial allocations are “not too unequal”....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049693

Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707

From Custer to Thermopylae: Last stand behavior in multi-stage contests

Gelder, Alan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 442-466

In a multi-stage contest known as a two-player race, players display two fundamental behaviors: (1) the laggard will make a last stand in order to avoid the cost of losing; and (2) the player who is ahead will defend his lead if it is threatened. Last stand behavior, in particular, contrasts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931187

The evolution of preferences for conflict

Wärneryd, Karl - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 1, pp. 102-104

We consider preference evolution in a class of conflict models with finite populations. We show that whereas aggregate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041591

Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games

Oprea, Ryan; Henwood, Keith; Friedman, Daniel - In: Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011) 6, pp. 2206-2225

Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk–Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576559