We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent on the outcome...

We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="bib15">Grossman and Hart (1980)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="bib17">Harris and Raviv (1988)</xref>, and Blair, Golbe and Gerard (1989). We consider three...

A model of a market with pairwise meetings is developed in which traders have asymmetric information about the true state of the world. The focus is on information transmission. The main questions concern the extent to which the information is revealed to uninformed agents through the trade...

The main idea of this article is that geographical concentration of stores selling similar products can be explained by consumers' imperfect information and their resulting need to search the market. A cluster of stores sustained by these forces is not necessarily located at the point that...

In this article, we consider how important developments in game theory have contributed to the theory of industrial organization. Our goal is not to survey the theory of industrial organization; rather, we consider the contribution of game theory through a careful discussion of a small number of...