We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap-talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is...

Eleven percent of the Malawian population is HIV infected. Eighteen percent of sexual encounters are casual. A condom is used one quarter of the time. A choice-theoretic general equilibrium search model is constructed to analyze the Malawian epidemic. In the developed framework, people select...

We develop a neoclassical trade model with heterogeneous factors of production. We consider a world with two factors, labor and "managers", each with a distribution of ability levels. Production combines a manager of some type with a group of workers. The output of a unit depends on the types of...

Market statistics can be viewed as noisy signals for true variables of interest. These signals are used by individual recipients of the statistics to imperfectly infer different variables of interest. This paper presents a framework under which the 'informativeness' of statistics is defined as...