"In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where the trusted player, called the temptee, has a temptation to betray. The strength of the temptation to betray varies from encounter to...

Reputations often guide sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider situations where each player is randomly matched with a partner in every period. One player – the truster – decides whether to trust. If trusted, the other player – the temptee – has a temptation to...

In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations where the players meet but once. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to...

Aseller in an online marketplace with an effective reputation mechanism should expect that dishonest behavior results in higher payments now whereas honest behavior results in a better reputation--and thus higher payments--in the future. We study the Window Aggregation Mechanism, a widely used...

This is the true story of the actual use of a formal, decentralized division procedure to allocate silver heirlooms among eight grandchildren fairly and efficiently without distasteful direct monetary payments. Each grandchild's stated preferences for objects in contention were roughly...