In the last twenty years or so years, there has been a surge of interest in modeling both national security and international political economy issues using the tools of game theory. In this brief note, I will not cite this now extensive literature but instead (1) outline four major theoretical...

A theoretical analysis of the probability of nuclear war is developed that assumes a starting probability and an annual reduction factor. Whatever the starting probability is, a constant reduction factor leads to an eventual probability that is less than 1, whereas the eventual probability goes...

Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally single-peaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some one-dimensional ordering. While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected coalitions that have a ‘hole’ in...

The relationship between Newcomb's problem, which involves an apparent paradox of prediction, and Prisoners' Dilemma is explicated. After describing a resolution to Newcomb's problem, due to John A. Ferejohn, that renders the two contradictory principles of choice in Newcomb's problem (dominance...

Deception, which involves the conscious misrepresentation by Deceiver of his preferences to Deceived in a game of incomplete information, is analyzed in 2 × 2 games in which the preferences of players are strictly ordered. The 78 distinct 2 × 2 games are divided into three mutually exclusive...