In this paper, we present a collective model of household demand based on Pareto-efficiency. In addition, we suppose that (a) each household member is egoistic and consumption is purely private, (b) there is a set of distribution factors and (c) there is one exclusive good. Then we derive the...

We examine the relative merits of targeting children within the household through price subsidies and cash transfers. To do so, we model the behavior of a household composed of one adult and one child. We then show that ‘favorable’ distortions from price subsidies may allow redistributing...

We consider the decisions of a married couple in a risky environment. The distribution of spouses’ bargaining power may change as a result of new outside opportunities that become available to them, so that individual consumption may fluctuate over time. This is what we call “bargaining...

We investigate the empirical content of the Nash solution to two-player bargaining games. The bargaining environment is described by a set of variables that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e. whether an agreement is...

Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix [2001] estimate a model of collective labor supply on US data. We adopt the same empirical specification and investigate household labor supply in France. We account for the non-linearity of the budget set. We note that the data validate only partially the...

In Chiappori's (1988) collective model of labor supply, hours of work are supposed flexible. In many countries, however, male labor supply does not vary much. In that case, the husband's labor supply is no longer informative about the household decision process and individual preferences. To...

The purpose of the paper is to measure technical efficiency levels in 15 OECD insurance industries over the period 1983-1991 and to decompose productivity changes into technical progress and efficiency variations. We show that the growth in the productivity observed in all countries is...

We adopt the collective approach to consumer behavior with egoistic agents and assume that household consumption is either private or public. We then show that (1) household demand functions have to satisfy testable constraints and (2) some elements of the decision process can be retrieved from...