Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation. We find, controlling for...

This paper addresses two questions: What accounts for the gender gap in labour-market outcomes? What are the driving forces behind the changes in the gender labour-market outcomes over the period 1968--1997? It formulates a dynamic general equilibrium model of labour supply, occupational...

This article considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker's productivity than potential employers. Previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers, the latter...

In this article, we examine optimal job choices when jobs differ in the rate at which they reveal information about workers’ skills. We then analyze how the optimal level of experimentation changes over a worker’s career and characterize job transitions and wage growth over the life cycle....

This article provides evidence that managers have private information they exploit for financial gain at the expense of shareholders. It develops a model of optimal contracting to show that moral hazard, hidden actions taken by agents, can rationalize why a principal would optimally induce...

We estimate a principal-agent model of moral hazard with longitudinal data on firms and managerial compensation over two disjoint periods spanning 60 years to investigate increased value and variability in managerial compensation. We find exogenous growth in firm size largely explains these...