In this paper we give structural characterizations of disjunctive and conjunctive hierarchical simple games by characterizing them as complete games with a unique shift-maximal losing coalition, and a unique shift-minimal winning coalition, respectively. We prove canonical representation...

This paper contributes to the program of numerical characterization and classification of simple games outlined in the classic monograph of von Neumann and Morgenstern. We suggest three possible ways to classify simple games beyond the classes of weighted and roughly weighted games. To this end...

There are many situations in which mis-coordinated strategic voting can leave strategic voters worse off than they would have been had they not tried to strategise. We analyse the simplest of such scenarios, in which a set of strategic voters all have the same sincere preferences and all...

In voting, the main idea of the distance rationalizability framework is to view the voters’ preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus. This approach, which is deeply rooted in the social choice literature, allows one to define (“rationalize”) voting rules via a...

In this paper we prove that the plurality rule and the run-off procedure are asymptotically strategy-proof for any number of alternatives and that the proportion of profiles, at which a successful attempt to manipulate might take place, is in both cases bounded from above by <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$K/\sqrt n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>,...</equationsource></inlineequation>