In this paper, we revisit the issue of bank fragility in the Diamond and Dybvig (J Polit Econ 91:401–419, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1983</CitationRef>) model with sequential service and finite traders. We provide a precise condition under which banks are susceptible to a run when the return on investment is low, and we show that...</citationref>

A random-matching model (of money) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called the banking sector, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called the non bank sector. Each...

We study optimal allocations in an environment in which money is essential due to lack of commitment and anonymity of individuals. Because the economy features aggregate preference shocks, we apply a notion of implementability that allows for allocations with non-trivial business-cycle dynamics...