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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336

An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - In: Games and economic behavior 97 (2016), pp. 186-204

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771355

Chapter 9. Algorithmic Mechanism Design : Through the lens of Multiunit auctions

Nisan, Noam - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 477-515). 2015

Mechanism design is a subfield of game theory that aims to design games whose equilibria have desired properties such as achieving high efficiency or high revenue. Algorithmic mechanism design is a subfield that lies on the border of mechanism design and computer science and deals with mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025450

Chapter 27 Market Design Using Agent-Based Models

Marks, Robert - In: Handbook of computational economics : volume 2, …, (pp. 1339-1380). 2006

markets in silico, using electricity markets and on-line double auctions as illustrations. A monopoly sealed-bid auction is … examined in the tenth paper, and a new auction mechanism is evolved and analyzed. The chapter concludes that, as modeling the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024378

Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items

Lavi, Ron; Nisan, Noam - In: Journal of economic theory 156 (2015), pp. 45-76

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011527593

Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions

Suzdaltsev, Alex - In: Journal of economic theory 206 (2022), pp. 1-30

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477729

Auction design with heterogeneous priors

Pham, Hien; Yamashita, Takuro - In: Games and economic behavior 145 (2024), pp. 413-425

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014545436

Bimodal bidding in experimental all-pay auctions

Ernst, Christiane; Thöni, Christian - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 608-623

We report results from experimental first-price, sealed-bid, all-pay auctions for a good with a common and known value. We observe bidding strategies in groups of two and three bidders and under two extreme information conditions. As predicted by the Nash equilibrium, subjects use mixed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240829

Flow Trading

Budish, Eric B.; Cramton, Peter C.; Kyle, Albert S.; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

We introduce and analyze a new market design for trading financial assets. The design allows traders to directly trade any user-defined linear combination of assets. Orders for such portfolios are expressed as downward-sloping piecewise-linear demand curves with quantities as flows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250116

Spite and reciprocity in auctions

Nishimura, Naoko; Cason, Timothy N.; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; … - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 365-411

overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending … price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752417