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We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production generates pollution and public firms are less efficient than private ones. In a differential game we compare (i) the Markov-Perfect Nash equilibrium under social planning;...
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In recent years Open Innovation (OI) processes have been receiving growing attention from the empirical and theoretical economic literature, where a debate is taking place on the aspects of complementarity or substitutability between internal R&D and OI spillover. By means of a differential game...
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To safeguard analytical tractability and the concavity of objective functions, the vast majority of models belonging to oligopoly theory relies on the restrictive assumption of linear demand functions. Here we lay out the analytical solution of a differential Cournot game with hyperbolic inverse...
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<Para ID="Par1">We employ the theory of Bayesian potential games to characterize pure-strategy equilibria of a Bayesian game with finite type structures, taking into account the cost/benefit features of agents. Building on a standard model of oligopolistic competition also applicable to environmental issues...</para>
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We derive analytic implicit form conditions for the qualitative analysis of government spending multipliers and the optimal level of government spending in presence of non-separability between private and public components of aggregate demand. Using the simplest neo-classical flexible price...
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