Abstract We consider an economy where production may use labor of two different skill levels. Workers are heterogeneous and, by investing in education, self-select into one of the two skills. Ex-ante, when firms choose their investments in physical capital, they do not know the level of human...

We study a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Investments are irreversible and noncontractible, due to random matching between firms and workers. Income is allocated according to the Nash bargaining mechanism. At equilibrium, given the...

We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents choose optimally to invest time and real resources in education. Generically, there is a steady state equilibrium where some agents, but not all of them, invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained inefficient in a...

We study the properties of a GEI model with nominal assets, outside money (injected into the economy as in Magill and Quinzii (J Math Econ 21:301–342, <CitationRef CitationID="CR17">1992</CitationRef>)), and multiple currencies. We analyze the existence of monetary equilibria and the structure of the equilibrium set under two different...</citationref>

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study the gender specific private returns on education (RE) in Europe in a comparative perspective. The authors extend the model of de la Fuente (2003) by estimating the parameters by gender and introducing maternity leaves and benefits. The paper...

: I21, I24, I28