In this paper, we examine how the geometry underlying revealed preference determines the set of preferences that can be revealed by choices. Specifically, given an arbitrary binary relation defined on a finite set, we ask if and when there exists a data set which can generate the given relation...

We study the design of mechanisms satisfying a novel desideratum: privacy. This requires the mechanism not reveal "much" about any agent's type to other agents. We propose the notion of joint differential privacy: a variant of differential privacy used in the privacy literature. We show by...

We study the sale of an indivisible good to liquidity constrained buyers: they cannot pay more than their “budget” regardless of their valuation. Both valuation and budget are private information. We derive the symmetric revenue maximizing and constrained efficient auctions in this setting....

We study decision makers who willingly forgo decision rules that vary finely with available information, even though these decision rules are technologically feasible. We model this behavior as a consequence of using classical, frequentist methods to draw robust inferences from data. Coarse...