We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a general Cournot market. Our results are as follows: when the number of firms is large, the bargaining set for each permissible coalition structure suggests that the patent holder...

By formulating negotiations about licensing payments as cooperative games without side payments, we investigate stable bargaining outcomes in licensing a cost-reducing technology of an external patent holder to oligopolistic firms producing a homogeneous product under two policies: fee and...

We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69–87, <CitationRef CitationID="CR15">2008</CitationRef>): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role...</citationref>