We approach the design of anti-discriminatory labor market regulation as a delegation problem. A private firm (the agent) is repeatedly faced with the opportunity of hiring one among several applicants to fill its vacancies. The firm is biased against applicants from some demographic group, and...

This paper studies optimal information disclosure in dynamic insurance economies with income risk in which an incumbent firm acquires more information about a consumer's persistent type than the rest of the market does. We find that if the incumbent can commit to long-term contracts but the...

We define educational access as the component of a neighborhood's value that is determined by the set of schools available to its residents. This paper studies the extent to which educational access is determined by sorting based on heterogeneous preferences over school attributes, or local...

I study the equilibrium and the welfare effects of international trade when product markets are imperfectly competitive due of search frictions--as in Burdett and Judd (1983)--rather than product differentiation--as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Markups are positive, even though there are...

I study a version of the search-theoretic model of imperfect competition by Burdett and Judd (1983) in which sellers face a strictly increasing rather than a constant marginal cost of production. The equilibrium exists and is unique, and its structure depends on the extent of search frictions....