We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen (Game Econ Behav 74:154–169, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">2012</CitationRef>) in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power...</citationref>

The first full characterization of social choice correspondences that are implementable in Nash equilibrium, given in Moore and Repullo (1990), together with the working principle behind an algorithm to check this condition, given in Sjöström (1991), can be used to give a simple necessary and...

In an important step forward Maskin [E. Maskin, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23–38] showed that two properties – monotonicity and no veto power – are together sufficient for Nash implementation. In contrast to the vast literature that followed, this...