The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) has frequently been used in recent spectrum auctions. It combines a dynamic clock phase and a one‐off supplementary round. The winning allocation and the corresponding prices are determined by the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves rules. These rules should...

We analyze a dynamic version of the Akerlof-Wilson "lemons" market in a competitive durable good setting. There is a fixed set of sellers with private information about the quality of their wares. The price mechanism sorts sellers of different qualities into different time periods--prices and...

We examine an oligopoly model where some consumers engage in costly non-sequential search to discover prices. There are three distinct price-dispersed equilibria characterized by low, moderate and high search intensity. The effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour,...

In a horizontal product differentiation model, it is shown that a stable service pattern in scheduled transport competition only exists if consumers are sufficiently sensitive to the quality of non-scheduling service characteristics. Since this sensitivity is related to travel distance, the...