We investigate the recent fee mechanism EIP1559 of the Ethereum network. Whereas previous studies have focused on myopic miners, we here focus on rational miners in the sense of having level-k foresight. We derive expressions for optimal miner behavior (in terms of setting block sizes) in the...

Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a new condition: “update monotonicity” for preference rules. Although many so-called impossibility theorems for the choice rules are based on–or related to–monotonicity conditions, this...

Individual disagreements are assumed to be reflected in the preferences. Distance functions, e.g., the well-known Kemeny (1959) metric, are used to measure these disagreements. However, a disagreement on how to rank the top two alternatives may be perceived more (or less) than a disagreement on...

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172–186, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2011</CitationRef>) introduced two new “population sensitivity” properties...</citationref>

We propose an aggregation model which explains stereotype formation under the attribution hypothesis. We show, under very mild axioms, that an observer can be thought of perceiving a group in terms of her subjective opinion about the representativeness of subgroups, as well as a possible...