We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance is evaluated by a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal fixes a set of prizes...

Surveys that are designed to measure subjective states (e.g., happiness) typically generate ordinal data. A fundamental problem is that methods used to analyse ordinal data (e.g., ordered probit) rely on strong and often unjustified distributional assumptions. In this paper, we propose using...

Surveys are an important tool in economics and in the social sciences more broadly. However, methods used to analyse ordinal survey data (e.g., ordered probit) rely on strong and often unjustified distributional assumptions. In this paper, we propose using survey response times to solve that...

Response times contain information about economically relevant but unobserved variables like willingness to pay, preference intensity, quality, or happiness. Here, we provide a general characterization of the properties of latent variables that can be detected using response time data. Our...

When firms decide to invest in R&D, they have to choose not only the amount of resources to invest, but also which research projects to develop. This paper investigates the market portfolio of research projects. Contrary to most of the literature, which focuses only on the level of investment in...

Contrary to most of the literature, which focuses only on the level of investment in innovation, this paper examines both the variety of research projects undertaken and the amount of duplication of research. A characterization of the equilibrium market portfolio of R&D projects and the socially...