type="main" xml:lang="en" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>We analyze the use of information in an oligopolistic insurance market with costly market entry. For intermediate values of entry costs, an equilibrium exists that is profit maximizing for incumbents and in which companies do not discriminate between high and...</p>

We consider a long-lived firm that faces an infinite sequence of finitely-lived consumers. In each period, the firm can exert either high or low effort, which is the firm's private information. When consumers learn about the firm's talent from the outcomes of previous transactions, there exists...

Many markets without repeated seller–buyer relations feature third-party “monitors” that sell recommendations. We analyze the profit-maximizing recommendation policies of such monitors. In an infinitely repeated game with seller moral hazard and short-lived consumers, a monopolistic...

We study the infinitely repeated prisonerʼs dilemma with the option to maintain or to quit relationships. We show that if agents imitate successful strategies infrequently, defection is not dynamically stable and cooperation emerges regardless of the initial distribution of strategies.