Experimenters make theoretically irrelevant decisions concerning user interfaces and ordering or labeling of options. Reanalyzing dictator games, I first show that such decisions may drastically affect comparative statics and cause results to appear contradictory across experiments. This...

We seek to extend our understanding of bargaining preferences, and do so experimentally using the three-player demand bargaining game. In this game, two non-proposers simultaneously state their demands, then the proposer offers, and at least one demand must be satisfied otherwise the proposal...

The extensive form game we study has multiple perfect equilibria, but it has a unique limiting logit equilibrium (QRE) and a unique level-k prediction as k approaches infinity. The convergence paths of QRE and level-k are different, but they converge to the same limit point. We analyze whether...

This paper analyzes strategic choice in p-beauty contests. First, I show that it is not generally a best reply to guess the expected target value, even in games with n2 players, and that iterated best response strictly applied does not induce a choice sequence approximating pk⋅0.5. Second, I...

In many industries, firms pre-order input and forward sell output prior to the actual production period. It is known that forward buying input induces a “Cournot–Stackelberg endogeneity” (both Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes may result in equilibrium) and forward selling output induces a...

The possibility of forward trading has been shown to restore social efficiency in Cournot oligopolies if marginal costs are constant. The paper analyzes the more general case that marginal costs are non-decreasing. I show that increasing marginal costs diminish the “strategic...