This paper analyses the centralisation of union wage bargaining when the workers' outside option is determined endogenously. A dual labour market model is developed where the wage rate in the first sector is either the result of decentralised bargaining at the firm level or of centralised...

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker׳s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai–Smorodinsky...

Empirical and experimental research suggests that minimum wages cause spillovers to wages higher up in the wage distribution, i.e., they may even raise wages that were already above the new minimum wage. In this paper, we analyze how these findings can be explained by theoretical wage bargaining...

type="main" xml:lang="en" <p>We examine behavioral gender differences and gender pairing effects in a laboratory experiment with face-to-face alternating-offers wage bargaining. Our results suggest that gender differences in bargaining behavior are role-dependent. We find that women obtain worse...</p>

This paper reports the results from a large online experiment in which we examine gender differences in time preferences. Subjects choose in different situations between receiving an immediate payment and receiving a different sum later. We find that more men than women are impatient and choose...

The paper presents a simple theoretical framework to explain the influence of the possibility to make non-binding announcements on investment behaviour in public goods settings. Our model builds on the idea that voluntary contributions to the supply of a public good might be motivated by some...

We show that the well-known result that static union models overstate distortions caused by unionism only holds in the special case of firm-level wage setting. With centralized wage setting, however, it rather depends on both the elasticity of labor demand and union's time preference rate...