In this paper, we examine reciprocity in an experiment using a sequential dictator game where the first round recipient becomes the second round dictator. The experiment is designed to study whether reciprocity can be observed when efficiency gains or strategic motivations are not present, i.e....

We study the relation between gender and stock holdings in Finland, a particularly gender equal country. We show that it is crucial to control for risk aversion using a measure of subjective risk-taking, rather than measures derived from abstract gambles. Controls related to financial knowledge...

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show...

Numerous studies suggest that communication may be a universal means to mitigate collective action problems. In this study, we challenge this view and show that the communication structure crucially determines whether communication mitigates or intensifies rent-seeking for pure public goods. We...

This paper examines the voluntary formation of centralized sanctioning institutions. We introduce a simple model to study institution formation as a second-order cooperation problem where voluntary contributions to a common fund serve as an instrument to finance centralized sanctioning...