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This note revisits the identification theorems of Brown (1983) and Roehrig (1988). We describe an error in the proofs of the main identification theorems in these papers, and provide an important counterexample to the theorems on the identification of the reduced form. Specifically, the reduced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005333004
This paper outlines recently developed techniques for estimating the primitives needed to empirically analyze equilibrium interactions and their implications in oligopolistic markets. It is divided into an introduction and three sections; a section on estimating demand functions, a section on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005204033
This paper outlines recently developed techniques for estimating the primitives needed to empirically analyze equilibrium interactions and their implications in oligopolistic markets. It is divided into an introduction and three sections; a section on estimating demand functions, a section on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024952
"This paper explores the connection between three important threads of economic research offering different approaches to studying the dynamics of an industry with heterogeneous firms. Finite models of the form pioneered by Ericson and Pakes (1995) capture the dynamics of a finite number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008648862
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009788165
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011481371
This paper presents a new approach to modeling transitional dynamics in dynamic models of imperfect competition, a crucial yet often neglected aspect of empirical models in industrial organization that seek to understand market responses to policy and environmental changes. We introduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015094887
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005379112
This paper explores the application of oblivious equilibrium to concentrated industries. We define an extended notion of oblivious equilibrium that we call partially oblivious equilibrium (POE) that allows for there to be a set of "dominant firms'', whose firm states are always monitored by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821901
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005088893