Showing 1 - 10 of 15
Fund managers are double agents; they serve both fund investors and owners of management firms. This conflict of interest may result in trading to support securities prices. Tests of this hypothesis in the Spanish mutual fund industry indicate that bank-affiliated mutual funds systematically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011208268
This paper describes the experimental studies carried out to test thermal cycling of a real-scale PCM–air heat exchanger at ambient temperatures. To achieve this goal an experimental setup previously designed and used for testing real-scale prototypes of PCM–air heat exchangers is modified....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011044705
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012621961
In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainty. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009439639
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005388101
We study an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs reap profits by exploiting mispricings across different market segments. We endogenize the asset structure as the outcome of a security design game played by the arbitrageurs. The equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005024386
A number of economists have supported the taxation of speculation in financial markets. We examine the welfare economics of such a tax in a model of a financial market where some agents have superior information and others have a hedging motive. We show that a tax on speculators may actually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005728234
We analyse an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs play an innovation game and exploit the resulting mispricings by reaping trading profits. Since the equilibrium asset structure is not chosen by a social planner, it is chosen to maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791699
In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainty. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136439
This paper studies the problem of optimal security design by a privately informed entrepreneur. In the context of a simple parametric model, it is shown that the entrepreneur does not find it profitable to float an asset that affords her an informational advantage. The reason is that, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005242897