One of the most well known models of non‐expected utility is Gul's (1991) model of disappointment aversion. This model, however, is defined implicitly, as the solution to a functional equation; its explicit utility representation is unknown, which may limit its applicability. We show that an...

We study preferences over lotteries in which both the prize and the payment date are uncertain. In particular, atime lotteryis one in which the prize is fixed but the date is random. With Expected Discounted Utility, individuals must be riskseekingover time lotteries (RSTL). In an incentivized...

We analyze a notion of self-confirming equilibrium with non-neutral ambiguity attitudes that generalizes the traditional concept. We show that the set of equilibria expands as ambiguity aversion increases. The intuition is quite simple: by playing the same strategy in a stationary environment,...