We analyze two firms’ choice between merging, allying, and trading assets. We consider a setting in which firms have assets, skills, and core capabilities; skills are the component of organizational capital that increases in the course of joint operations, core capabilities the component that...

Countries can repeatedly and opportunistically renegotiate the terms of agreements to which they can only complicitly assent. Therefore, when attempting to coordinate exchange rate policies, they continuously play partnership games. We develop a reduced form model of exchange rate management...

Debt with many creditors is analysed in a continuous-time pricing model of the levered firm. We specifically allow for debtor opportunism vis-à-vis a non-coordinated group of creditors, in form of repeated strategic renegotiation offers and default threats. We show that the creditors' initial...

Debt with many creditors is analyzed in a continuous-time pricing model of the levered firm with opportunistic renegotiation offers and default threats. Dispersed creditors accept coupon concessions only in exchange for guaranteed liquidation rights, like collateral. In the ex ante optimal debt...

When firms experience financial distress, equity holders may act strategically, forcing concessions from debtholders and paying less than the originally contracted interest payments. This article incorporates strategic debt service in a standard, continuous time asset pricing model, developing...

We analyze the role of knowhow acquisition in the formation and duration of joint ventures. Two parties become partners in a joint venture to benefit from each other's knowhow. Joint operations provide each party with the opportunity to acquire part of its partner's knowhow. A party's increased...