We study optimal dynamic compliance decisions in an uncertain environment. Contrary to the static literature, greater uncertainty affects consumption, not the optimal tax evasion rule. Thus, audit and sanctions rather than fiscal uncertainty should be used to control tax evasion.

The reforms that have reshaped the public health care systems have often been coupled with devolution. However, this process has frequently been accompanied by widespread soft budget constraint policies. In this paper we argue that the soft budget constraint arises from a cooperative game...

In a model where health care provision, its regional distribution and the equalisation grant are the result of a utilitarian bargaining between a (relatively) rich region and a poor one, a First Best solution can be reached only if the two Regions have the same bargaining power. From a policy...

In a dynamic optimisation framework we show that the optimal tax evasion can be either a positive or a negative function of the tax rate according to the form of the fine to be paid when evasion is detected.

We study optimal dynamic tax evasion in the framework proposed by Lin and Yang (2001) and Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2011) with some modifications: a more flexible utility function, a more realistic audit process, and a penalty function which can be defined both on evaded income and evaded...