Abstract We apply the idea of relational contracting to a simple problem of regulating a single-product monopoly with unverifiable (then ex ante not contractible) quality. We model the interaction between the regulator and the firm as an infinitely repeated game; we observe that there exist...

type="main" <p>We study the effect of a new university in a two-city model in which individuals’ utility depends on own ability, peer group ability, formal education and mobility costs. We compare a monopoly (one university in one city) with a two-university system (one university in each city)....</p>

Concerns about the environmental effects of procurement decisions are gaining momentum. We investigate how the environmental quality of public purchases changes under two possible institutional settings: a centralized one, where a single regulator is in charge of both production efficiency and...

The current waste crisis in Italy is the most recent evidence that criminal organisations can impact waste management heavily. Nonetheless, this aspect has been neglected by current literature. We take the first step in filling this gap by developing a model which allows for the presence of a...