We study risk taking on behalf of others in an experiment on a large random sample. The decision makers in our experiment are facing high-powered incentives to increase the risk on behalf of others through hedged compensation contracts or with tournament incentives. Compared to a baseline...

This paper investigates face-to-face lying and beliefs associated with it. In experiments in Sweden and Japan, subjects answer questions about personal characteristics, play a face-to-face sender-receiver game and participate in an elicitation of lie-detection beliefs. The previous finding of...

Beliefs in signals that reveal lies and truths are widespread. It is shown that such beliefs may be exploited strategically in signaling games of pure conflict of interest. Truth and lie detection is modeled by signals perceived by the receiver that are emitted with a probability contingent on...

This paper analyses the credibility of author anonymity that is provided by a double-blind review process. It is argued that authors have strong incentives to disseminate information about their papers before publication. A sample from two economics journals, both using double-blind review...

This paper explores the effects of communication in market entry games experimentally. It is shown that communication increases coordination success substantially and generate inferior outcomes for consumers when market entry costs are symmetric. Such effects are not observed when costs are...